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MARTIN CARRIER* 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE MIRACLE 
ARGUMENT? 1 
IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in 
applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will 
draw some systematic onclusions from some historical case studies. More 
specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is 
frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I 
can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten 
out the argument i self as well as the position it is intended to support. 
1. Realism and the Miracle Argument 
The modern form of scientific realism was inaugurated by Putnam and 
encompasses the following two claims: 
(1) The theories in mature science are typically approximately true. 
(2) The central terms of these theories are typically genuinely referential. 2 
It is apparent from this characterization that scientific realism gives a realist 
interpretation of the theoretical terms and the theoretical mechanisms of a 
theory; it does not merely entertain the view that the empirical consequences of 
an empirically adequate theory somehow mirror existing objects or processes. 
The latter claim is characteristic of what may be called "common-sense 
realism", and it is transparent that common-sense r alism is implied by 
scientific realism but not vice versa. Scientific realists usually add to the above- 
mentioned postulates that the currently accepted theories indeed represent 
mature science. Accordingly, it is supposed that the central theoretical 
concepts of our present heories actually possess real counterparts. 
One of the chief arguments (or even the chief argument) put forward in 
support of this position is the "Miracle Argument" (also called the "Ultimate 
Argument"). It says, roughly, that without assuming that science describes the 
real world the predictive success of science would be an utter miracle. The anti- 
realist is at a loss to offer a reason why a theory could possibly manage 
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successfully to predict phenomena. The realist, by contrast, can ol]'er such a 
reason by saying that a theory's predictive success is a consequence of its 
matching somehow the real objects and their interactions. 
The realist interpretation of scientific oncepts and theories is advanced as a 
hypothesis or, in fact, as the only conceivable hypothesis that makes the 
success of science comprehensible. In this sense, it is thought to afl'ord an 
explanation of the success of science. Accordingly, it is construed as an 
empirical hypothesis that is supported by the manner in which science 
progresses.3 
This explanation of scientific success is given by an argument hat runs 
roughly as follows. 
(1) Approximate truth of a theory implies empirical success of this theory. 
(2) Genuine reference of a theory's theoretical terms is a necessary ingredient 
of this theory's truth. 
(3) As a matter of a fact, scientific theories are empirically successful. 
(4) Therefore, scientific theories are probably approximately true and their 
theoretical terms are probably genuinely referential) 
It is generally agreed that this argument is not deductively valid: it commits the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent. This is the reason for inserting the 
qualification "probable" into the conclusion. The relevant probability depends 
upon how many alternative xplanations t\~r the success of science are conceiv- 
able. If realism is in fact the only possible explanation, then the argument 
becomes deductively sound. 
It is essential for the realist position that genuine reference of the theoretical 
concepts does not imply (approximate) truth of the pertinent heory. Realism 
embraces a cumulative view of scientific progress in the sense that earlier and 
now-rejected theories actually referred to the same entities as our present ones 
do. Mendel's Tactors' are identical with the genes of modern molecular 
biology, and Dalton's atoms are the same as Bohr's. The failure of these older 
views is only due to telling the wrong story about the right objects, i.e. to 
ascribing the wrong properties and features to correctly identified entities. ~ But 
improving a theory while retaining its theoretical objects is only possible if 
theoretical change doesn't automatically change the theory's ubject matter. So 
whereas a theory's truth implies genuine reference of the theoretical terms 
employed, genuine reference does not imply truth. In short, truth is sufficient 
for reference, reference is necessary for truth." This implies that reference is in 
any case unsuited as a basis of a comprehensive explanation of the success of 
science, What reference can at most account for is how the success of science is 
possible. 
~Cf. Putnam 1978: 19: M:plin 1984a: 203. 
"*This pattern unities two schemes given b? Laudan: of, Laudan 1984: 220. 
sCf. Putnam [978:22 4, 
"Cf. Musgrave 19,88: 236. 
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Laudan has taken seriously realism's claim of furnishing an explanation of 
the predictive success of scientific theories. If realism is an empirical hypothesis 
about the progress of science, it should be testable by applying it to the history 
of science. What could count as empirical counter-evidence for a realist 
interpretation? If reference is necessary for truth and if the (tentative) empirical 
indicator of truth is predictive success (so that truth can explain predictive 
success), there should not exist theories that are both non-referential nd 
successful. In order to be able to contrast his historical retrodiction with 
historical experience, we need a criterion for identifying non-referring theories. 
The only plausible option available is to take the present state of knowledge as 
a basis for this judgment, This may appear objectionable but since scientific 
realism adopts the very same assumption, this objection would apply to 
realism and anti-realism alike. 
As Laudan points out, the history of science is littered with theories 
exhibiting the unexpected conjunction of being non-referential nd successful. 
To rehearse just a few of his examples, there are the theory of crystalline 
spheres in ancient astronomy, the humoral theory in medicine, the fluid theory 
of electricity, the phlogiston theory, and the caloric theory of heat. All these 
theories employed concepts which (according to our own lights) lack reference 
but were nonetheless highly successful in their respective lifetimes. These cases, 
Laudan concludes, may be considered historical refutations of scientific 
realism. 7
In fact, however, Laudan's argument suffers from a weakness that crucially 
diminishes its fbrce. The problem concerns the notion of empirical success. 
Laudan (as well as some realists such as Putnam, see his 1978 for instance) 
invokes a notion of empirical success that is in no way suited to serve the 
desired aim. The following notion of empirical success underlies Laudan's 
argument. A theory is said to be successful if, first, it exhibits only a small 
number of anomalies and accomodates the facts in its intended domain of 
application with satisfactory precision, and second, it is accepted by the 
relevant scientific community? Predictive success is, accordingly, meant to 
refer to the successful prediction of single observations or of the outcome of 
single experiments. 
As some realists have observed, however, realism cannot be founded on such 
a conception. After all, it is hardly surprising (and, consequently, not in need 
of any realist explanation) that theories that are explicitly designed to cope 
with a certain class of phenomena ctually do cope with this class. If a theory 
is constructed such that it fits certain known phenomena, we aren't struck by 
the fact that it actually fits these phenomena. There is no miracle involved here. 
~Cf. Laudan 1984:225 226. 231. On the other hand, Laudan also adduces cases of referring but 
unsuccessful theories as counter-examples to scientific realism: cf. ibid., 223. But as ! mentioned 
above~ such cases are perfectly compatible with realism's claims. 
~This notion is only partly explicit in Laudan; for the explicit parts cf. Laudan 1984: 222. 
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And if there is no explanandum, realism can hardly be credited with pro'~iding 
the explanans. Accordingly, it is not predictive success simp/icimr that is at 
stake here but rather a special variant of predictixe success: namely', the 
successful extension of  a theory's scope beyond its formerly assumed bound- 
aries. What is really miraculous is Whewell's "'consilience of inductions" and 
Duhem's "theoretical prediction of  hitherto unknown laws". It is only the 
explanation of these two kinds of predictive success that could support a realist 
interpretation2 
Consilience of  inductions is characterized by the following two leatures. 
(1) Laws that are thought o describe different kinds of phenomena re unified 
by a theory. After the formulation of  the theory the phenomena ppear 
related, i.e. as results of a common cause or process. 
(2) The theoretical unitication has not been brought about deliberately. A 
theory' designed to accommodate one class of phenomena was later found 
to accommodate another and apparently different class in addition. That 
is, the successful unification did not result from modifying and adjusting 
the theory for that purpose" rather, it came out as an unexpected and 
surprising coincidence. 
One of  Whewell's examples l\~r consilience of  reductions is Newton's hypo- 
thesis of  universal gravitation. This hypothesis, as Whewell tells the story, was 
introduced to explain Kepler's third law. But in addition to that, it also 
explained the other two Keplerian laws, which, according to the previous state 
of knowledge, were unconnected with the third one and with each other. > 
Moreover, the hypothesis accounted t\~r the precession of  the equinoxes that 
apparently constituted an altogether dissimilar titct. ~ 
The appearence of consilience, Whewell goes on to say, reliably indicates 
that the theory has somehow captured the real world. 
No example  can be pointed out,  in tile whole h istory of  science, so far as I am aware, 
in which this Consilience of Inductions hats given testimony in I'avour of an 
hypothesis afterwards discovered to be false. If we take one class of facts unly, 
knowing the law which they follow, we ma> construct an hypothesis, or perhaps 
several, which may represent hem: and as new circumstances are discovered, we 
may often adjust the hypothesis o as to correspond to these also. But when the 
hypothesis, of itself and without adjustment for the purpose, gives us the rule and 
reason of a class not contemplated in its construction, we have a criterion of its 
reality, which has never yet been produced in liwour of IMsehood, j:
"Cf. Leplin 1984a: 21)5, 217: Musgrave 1988:231 234, A similar argument is de,.eloped m 
Friedman 1983: 241-248. 
~'~This story is not quite true. Kepler's account, loo, suggests a dynamical relation between these 
laws although it is less intimate than in the Newtonian approach. For a reconstruction of Kepler's 
dynamical theory underlying his laws cf. Carrier and Mittelstrass 1989: 144-149. 
~Cf. Whewell 1858: 153-154: of. also Fisch 1985: 239-241. 
':Whewell 1858:154 155. 
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Put the other way around, only if we assume that our theory somehow reflects 
the real state of affairs, do we understand that and how consilience can come 
about. 
This train of thought is instantiated by Perrin's argument in favor of the 
reality of molecules dating from 1913. Perrin pointed to the fact that Avogad- 
ro's number could be experimentally determined by a wide variety of methods 
(that Perrin himself had contributed to enlarge). These methods take recourse 
to such apparently unrelated phenomena s Brownian movement, X-ray 
diffraction, electrolytic decomposition, etc. Remarkably enough, the values of 
Avogadro's number obtained from these quite distinct experiments agreed. 
This agreement, Perrin argued, supplies us with a strong reason for the real 
existence of molecules (which Avogadro's number efers to).~3 Put in Whewell's 
terms, Perrin's argument comes down to an inference from successful consil- 
ience to veracity. Atomic theory establishes a relation between regularities or 
effects that would appear completely unconnected otherwise. Without that 
theory, the numerical coincidence of the outcome of the diverse experiments 
would seem utterly miraculous. Only by supposing that these experiments 
actually refer to the same aspect of reality can resort to a miracle be avoided. 
A similar point is made by Duhem. Unlike Whewell, Duhem focuses on the 
successful prediction of novel facts, i.e. of empirical laws formerly unknown to 
science. If a theory is regarded as a purely artificial system, Duhem argues, we 
cannot expect it to entail successful predictions of hitherto undiscovered 
regularities. On this view, such a prediction would have to be considered a
"marvelous feat of chance". If, on the other hand, the theory is assumed to 
grasp the real order of things, it is natural to expect that there are some 
previously undetected novelties hidden in it. 
The highest est, therefore, of our holding a classification as a natural one is to ask it 
to indicate in advance things which the future alone will reveal. And when the 
experiment is made and confirms the predictions obtained from our theory, we feel 
strengthened in our conviction that the relations established by our reason among 
abstract notions truly correspond to relations among things. TM
Duhem's example is the prediction of 'Poisson's pot' by Fresnel's wave theory 
of light. In 1819, Poisson derived a seemingly absurd consequence from 
Fresnel's recently-proposed theory that regarded light as transverse oscillatory 
motion in a mechanical ether. According to this theory, Poisson argued, there 
must appear a bright spot in the middle of the shadow of a circular screen lit 
by a point source of light; and this grotesque consequence was thought to 
provide ample evidence that the theory was self-defeating. Contrary to 
universal expectation, however, this startling prediction could actually be 
~3Cf. Salmon 1984: 214-220, 
~4Duhem 1906: 28. There is an important difference, however, between Duhem's natural 
classification and realism proper. I will come back to that in section 3. 
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verified, and this indicates that the pertinent heory contains an element of 
truth.ZS 
In the light of these considerations, a more specific and more tenable version 
of the Miracle Argument can be given. What seems astonishing from an anti- 
realist point of view is the capacity of some theories to successfully predict 
either novel regularities (Duhem) or novel relations between known regulari- 
ties (Whewell) without any adjustment for that purpose. Without any 
tampering with the theory, it enables us to tbresee what we never woqld have 
suspected otherwise. 
Put this way, there is some plausibility to the realist claim that there is an 
explanatory problem associated with the predictive success of science. If there 
occurs success of the kind mentioned (i.e. strong predictive success, as I will 
call it), it seems justified to conclude, at least on the lace of it, that the theory 
thus distinguished truthfully portrays (some aspects o13 reality. That is, I grant 
that (1) there is something to the realist contention that strong predictive 
success is a pure miracle by anti-realist lights and that (2) realism can supply a 
natural explanation of it. Furthermore, I admit that (3) current anti-realist 
replies miss the target. Anti-realists sometimes deny any special status to 
strong success: novel confirmations and known instances are on the same 
looting. So it is argued that it simply follows from the empirical adequacy of a 
theory that all its consequences (including the unexpected ones) arc empirically 
adequate. ~' But this is less than persuasive. The difficulty is how such a 
comprehensive empirical adequacy is at all possible. We want to understand 
what the causal origin of strong predictive success is, and neither of the anti- 
realist maneuvers gives a satisfactory causal explanation of this. 
2. History as the Touchstone of lhe Miracle Argument 
The stage is now set for the historical case studies. I have concluded that 
there exists a non-trivial explanatory problem and that realism offers a possible 
solution to that problem. So let's examine how this realist solution fares 
empirically. I will argue in the spirit of Laudan's approach, i.e. I will present 
some examples that undermine the realist explanatory claim. Since Laudan's 
historical counter-examples contain no reference to strong predictive success, 
his alleged refutation leaves scientific realism unscathed. So it's necessary to 
amend Laudan's argument. 
Let me begin by clarifying what exactly has to be done. The improved 
version of the Miracle Argument says that reference is necessary for strong 
success. An empirical rebuttal of that argument must present cases in which 
~sCf. Duhem 1906: 29-30. 
'~For a criticism of strategies of this kind cf. Musgrave 1988:242 43. 
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non-referring theories have been strongly successful. Moreover, an important 
caveat must be heeded. There are lots of strongly successful predictions of false 
theories that stemmed from the correct aspects of these theories. Fresnel's 
strongly successful theory is an ether theory of light, and it is wrong and non- 
referring for this reason alone. The prediction of Poisson's pot, however, did 
not rely on this aspect but on the hypothesis that light is a transverse wave. 
And this hypothesis i approximately true in the light of our current state of 
knowledge. The same holds for the consilience of inductions accomplished by 
Newton's theory of gravitation. Although this theory has been superseded and 
replaced by General Relativity, it is still valid as a limiting case, Another case 
in point is the prediction of the phases of Venus by both Copernican and 
Tychonic astronomy. Although both theories are off the target, they got the 
crucial feature right; namely, that Venus revolves around the sun rather than 
around the earth. A viable anti-realist argument can only be based on cases in 
which wrong aspects of wrong theories are responsible for strong predictive 
success of these theories. I will present wo such cases; the first is Priestley's 
prediction of the reductive properties of hydrogen based on the phlogiston 
theory, the second is Dalton's and Gay-Lussac's prediction of the equality of 
thermal expansion of all gases based on the caloric theory of heat. 
According to the phlogiston theory, phlogiston is the "principle of com- 
bustibility", i.e. it is contained in all combustible substances and escapes in 
burning. Combustion is decomposition i to phlogiston and some residue. The 
same model was thought to apply to the calcination of metals (i.e. their 
"oxidation"). When a metallic calx ("oxide") is formed from a metal, phlo- 
giston is set free, and this implies that all metals are compounds of their 
respective calces and phlogiston. 
In 1766, this theoretical account was empirically confirmed by Cavendish. 
He dissolved some metals (iron, tin, and zinc) in some acids (hydrochloric acid 
and diluted sulphuric acid) and found that a gas with some noteworthy 
properties escaped. ~7 This gas (hydrogen by our present lights) was extremely 
light, extremely combustible and burned without any recognizable residue. ~s 
Moreover, Cavendish ascertained that the outcome of the experiment was 
independent of the nature and strength of the acid employed ~9 and concluded 
from this that the inflammable air, as he called the new gas, didn't originate 
from the acid. So he was left with the assumption that the gas was released 
from the metal. Given the background knowledge of the time, it was almost 
self-evident that a light, combustible gas contained in metals and burning 
without residue could be nothing other than pure phlogiston. Accordingly, 
~One example of the reactions occurring is in modern terms: Fe + 2HCI---,FeCI_, + It,. 
~Cavendish noticed that there appeared water in burning the gas but he interpreted this water as 
moisture dissolved in the gas and deposited in combustion. 
'gThere was a different result if concentrated (instead of diluted) sulphuric acid was employed 
but this difference could easily be explained. I won't go into these ramifications here. 
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Cavendish thought that he had succeeded in experimentally idcntit:ving 
phlogiston. >
In 1782 Priestley managed to predict successfully a novel regularity on the 
basis of this interpretation. If inflammable air is pure phlogiston, so his 
reasoning went, it should be able to supply the phlogiston necessary to 
transform a calx into a metal. In other words, inflammable air should exhibit 
the same chemical effects as charcoal which was known to be rich in phlo- 
giston. Priestley succeeded in confirming this novel prediction. He heated 
several calces in inflammable air and observed that the gas almost completely 
disappeared and that the calces turned into their respective metals. This 
demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the calces have absorbed the 
inflammable air and thereby regained their metallic properties, er 
It is apparent hat this case is a full-blown example of Duhem novelty. We 
have a theoretical prediction of an empirical regularity that was not known to 
science before and that was not to be expected prior to the formulation of 
Cavendish's variant of the phlogiston theory. On the other hand, the under- 
lying theory is completely off the mark. The reductive properties of hydrogen 
are due to the fact that hydrogen easily gives off electrons and this is not even 
remotely similar to its capacity of supplying phlogiston to metallic calces. The 
reductive properties of hydrogen have nothing to do with its being the 
principle of combustibility contained in all metals. Though the model is as 
non-referring as it could be, it was strongly successful. 
The second example is taken from the caloric theory of heat, which regards 
heat as a material substance. Temperature is to be identified with the concen- 
tration of caloric, i.e. the density of caloric is high in a warm body and low in a 
cold one. Because of its material nature caloric is indestructible, and this 
implies a conservation law for heat. Like all other substances, caloric is 
composed of particles. According to affinity theory, that is, according to the 
generally accepted theory of chemical reaction and chemical bonding, all 
particles attract each other by means of short-range forces, the strength of 
which is dependent upon distance and varies with the chemical nature of the 
respective substances. This is roughly true of heat particles as well: that is, they 
attract particles of other substances. There is, however, one peculiar aspect 
about these heat particles, namely, a repulsive force is present between them. 
This repulsion is evidenced by thermal expansion. The cause of thermal 
2°For Cavendish's argumentation cf. Cavendish 1766: 78-80; Str6ker 1982: 187-192. 
2~Cf. Partington 1963:268 269. In fact, Priestley had synthesized water in this experiment. It did 
not escape his notice that water appeared here but he attributed it (as Cavendish before him) to 
moisture already contained in the inflammable air. Priestley also observed that the calx lost weight 
during this process, which contrasted with the interpretation that it had absorbed inflammable air. 
He explained this anomaly away by assuming that there occurred a partial sublimation of the calx 
during heating. 
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expansion is that the particles of the heated body are carried along or pushed 
apart by the heat particles, indicating in this way the effect of the repulsion 
between the latter. 
On this account, the solid state is characterized by an equilibrium between 
the attractive affinity forces (that are specific to each substance) and caloric 
repulsion (that is unspecific to chemical nature). This implies that the thermal 
expansion of solid bodies varies from substance to substance, as was long well- 
known. But things are different with respect o the gaseous tate. Gases are 
characterized by an accumulation of caloric', after all, they can be generated by 
heating. In this state the particles of the body are pushed so far apart that the 
short-range attractive forces between them are no longer effective and the 
repulsive force between the caloric particles prevails. This means that the 
elastic properties of gases are due exclusively to the repulsion between these 
caloric particles. Thermal expansion of gases is nothing but expansion of 
caloric. This has in turn the consequence that the rate of expansion is the same 
for all gases. -~2 In 1802, Dalton and Gay-Lussac, independently of each other, 
ascertained that this is indeed true and thereby confirmed a novel prediction of 
caloric theory. 
From the modern point of view, the equality of the thermal expansion of 
gases comes about roughly as follows. Because of the large relative distances of 
gas molecules and because of their high kinetic energies, the strength of 
substance-specific bonding forces between them (the van-der-Waals forces) 
becomes negligible. Correspondingly, gases can be approximately interpreted 
as collections of colliding point mass particles. These collisions can be analyzed 
on the basis of the laws of mechanics. Such an analysis yields that the ratio 
/NV/'•T is constant for all gases, as it is required by Dalton's and Gay- 
Lussac's law. 
In this example we encounter again the peculiar features of Duhem novelty: 
there is a confirmed prediction of an empirical law that was previously 
unknown to the relevant scientific community and furthermore not to be 
expected given the background knowledge (that is, the state of knowledge 
without the theory in question). Accordingly, caloric theory was strongly 
successful. Nevertheless, the central concepts employed in the caloric explana- 
tion are entirely non-referring. The pivotal point of the caloric account is the 
assumption of repulsive forces of caloric. But on the modern view there is no 
caloric and there are no repulsive forces of any other kind involved. Nothing 
similar to the essential ingredient of the caloric explanation actually exists in 
nature. 
:ZThis line of reasoning is explained in Ha/iy 1805: 388-392: cf. also Laplace 1796: 390. 
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3. The Miracle Argument and Duhem's Natural Classification 
These examples make it clear that tile Miracle Argument does not show 
what it is intended to show. It is safe to conclude that strong predictive success 
may well go along with lack of reference of the central terms employed. 
Reference is no l  necessary for strong success. This implies that the success of 
science cannot be even partially explained by assuming that the theoretical 
terms of successful theories are genuinely referential. The realist core assump- 
tion cannot be grounded on historical consideration,,, of lhe kind examined 
here. On the other hand, therc is the strong intuition that there must exist a 
cause of strong predictive success. After all, we now understand less than ever 
how strong success is possible. So what is to be made of this conflict'? 
A closer look at the examples discussed suggests the following answer. Both 
explanations didn't miss the point in such a large measure as it may appear 
from the foregoing presentation. There is one feature in them that is, in fact, 
preserved across the theoretical change. This feature concerns the ordering or 
classification of the phenomena covered. That is. phenomena bound together 
by and viewed as results of a common underlying process in the outdated 
approach remain so related in the up-to-date fl'amework. Let's reconsider both 
examples in order to recognize more clearly how this is to be understood. 
As regards the phlogiston case, ('avendish's experiment was interpreted as 
the release of phlogiston which involved the calcination of the metal employed. 
Priestley's empirical demonstration of the reduclive properties of hydrogen 
was seen as the precise reversal of" this process: the calx took up phlogiston 
thereby turning into a metal. This means, both reactions are instantiations of 
the same chemical process: their only difl'erence is that this process is going off 
in opposite directions. 
What about the modern view'? On the face of it, both reactions are attached 
different labels. In Cavendish's experiment the acid is split tip and its hydrogen 
set free whereas its residue combines with the metal (forming a chloride, lk)r 
instance: see footnote 17). In Priestley's experiment, on the other hand, the 
oxide loses its oxygen and is reduced to the metal: the oxygen combines with 
the hydrogen present and forms ~ater. So what appeared to be of like nature 
then, appears to be dissimilar now. 
On closer inspection, however, these dissimilarities vanish. If we invoke the 
modern concept of oxidation both experiments are again instantiations of the 
same process. According to this modern concept, oxidation is not character- 
ized as a combination with oxygen but as a loss of electrons. Conversely, a
reduction is a gain of electrons. Viewed from this perspective, an oxidation has 
taken place in Cavendish's experiment whereas a reduction Fiats occurred in 
Priestley's. So the theoretical classification is retained espite all changes in the 
content of the pertinent heories. 
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The same aspect is present in the caloric example. Here we have a connec- 
tion between interpreting a gas as a universal state of matter and deriving the 
equality of the thermal expansion coefficients of all gases. As caloric theory 
explained, gaseous properties are the result of the accumulation of caloric in a 
body, and this implied that all substances can become gasiform (if suitable 
conditions are realized). 2~ But by invoking the very same process of accumu- 
lation of caloric, caloric theory was in a position to predict the universal 
equality of the expansion rates. It's the physical nature of a gas that accounts 
both for its being a general state of matter and for its like expansion. Both 
facts are consequences of a common underlying mechanism. 
As for the modern view, there is no need for detailed argument in order to 
realize that the connection between these two features is faithfully preserved in 
kinetic theory. The very same mechanical analysis that reveals the molecular 
structure of gases and hence suggests that gases are a state of matter in general 
also allows for a derivation of equal expansion rates. Again, although the 
content of the respective theories has changed ramatically, the classification 
they impose upon the phenomena has remained unaltered. 
I'd like to formulate the upshot of this discussion by the following conjec- 
ture. If a theory predicts a novel fact by relating it to another one, i.e. by 
making the new one and the old one instantiations of the same underlying 
process or mechanism, both facts are tied together truthfully. That is, a 
common bond of this kind reflects a real connection. It is tempting (though not 
supported by the examples discussed) to generalize this conjecture such that it 
also holds for consilience of inductions. If two laws are related by a consilient 
process this relation portrays a real similarity. 
In fact, this proposal amounts to the resurrection of an old idea, namely 
Duhem's conception of a "natural classification". It is noteworthy that, first, 
for Duhem the Miracle Argument does not show that the concepts used in 
strongly successful predictions are genuinely referential. Concepts are only in 
our mind and nothing real corresponds to them. Second, what are indeed 
reflections of an underlying ontological order, Duhem argues, are the relations 
these concepts induce among the phenomena. Strongly successful theories tend 
to establish a natural classification. In a natural classification the ideal connec- 
tions introduced by a theory among abstract concepts correspond to real 
relations among the associated entities. For Duhem, it is not the theoretical 
interpretation of the laws but their theoretical organization and logical order 
that mirrors reality. 24 Using Duhem's concept of natural classification, one 
may reformulate the above-given conjecture as follows: strong predictive 
-~This was by no means a matter of course. It was often assumed that gaseous properties appear 
only in some peculiar substances. 
24Cf. Duhem 1906: 24-27. Cf. also the quote above footnote 14. 
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success indicates that the theory supported in that fashion has classified the 
covered phenomena in a natural way. 
Let me formulate the same claim in a different erminology. Every corpus of 
laws introduces a taxonomy into its universe of discourse. It binds certain 
objects and processes together and determines, accordingly, which objects and 
processes are to he considered as similar or dissimilar espectively. If a theory 
contains laws that use predicates such as "release of phlogiston" or "accumu- 
lation of caloric", it generalizes over the processes designated by these terms. 
This means the theory collects the different instantiations of these processes 
into equivalence classes. They are of the same type by virtue of falling under 
the same law. Accordingly, a theory implies criteria for the individuation of 
phenomena. The phenomena tied together by the fact that one and the same 
law applies to them are said to constitute a "natural kind". -~5 
Expressed in terms of natural kinds, my conjecture takes the following form. 
The natural-kind structure implied by strongly successful theories reflects an 
underlying structure of likeness and difference in nature. Equivalence classes of 
like phenomena that are generated by theoretical anticipation of either 
Duhemian or Whewellian brand indicate really-existing equivalence relations 
among the phenomena. This implies that only in rare instances can natural 
kinds justifiably be considered as truly natural. 
Whereas the types of phenomena introduced by a theory may thus some- 
times rightly be said to correspond to real types, the criteria according to which 
the types are created or individuated ought not likewise be supposed to 
correspond to something real. At least, there is no reason to believe that the 
latter correspondence actually holds. As the two case studies were intended to 
show, the properties and mechanisms that are used to tie the various pheno- 
mena together are subject to drastic historical change. Whereas the natural- 
kind structure induced by a theory sometimes fits with the relations of likeness 
and difference in reality, the nature of the mechanisms invoked to single out 
what is like and what is different strongly varies with the relevant heories. 
This is why classificatory correspondence has nothing to do with reference. 
If there really is a classificatory correspondence b tween (the relevant aspects 
of) strongly successful theories and reality, this by no means implies that the 
concepts employed in these theories are genuinely referential. There is no 
referential tie whatsoever between phlogiston and electrons or between the 
repulsive forces of caloric and the kinetic energy of molecules. It is the 
relations they impose on observable phenomena nd not their natures that 
coincide. So classificatory correspondence b tween theory and reality does not 
imply genuine reference of the central concepts used. 
:sCf. Fodor 1974:101 102. 
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4. Conclusion 
Accordingly, the overall upshot of the discussion is, first, that there is indeed 
something veridical in once strongly successful but now abandoned theories. In 
this sense the Miracle Argument is right and this saves our intuition that there 
is something special about strong success. Classificatory correspondence gives 
a causal explanation of how strong success is possible. If a theory contains a 
correct clement of this kind we understand how it can manage to bring about 
strong success. 
Second, it is clear that this truthful element does not entail or amount to 
genuine reference. As the historical examples have shown, a theory may exhibit 
classificatory correspondence without its central notions even remotely refer- 
ring to anything real. But I take this claim to genuine reference to be the very 
core and kernel of scientific realism. So we may conclude that the Miracle 
Argument cannot support any realist persuasions. The argument from strong 
success to genuine reference doesn't work empirically. 
This entails, third, that in addition to this empirical inadequacy there is a 
conceptual non-sequitur involved in the realist reasoning. Suppose that it 
should be discovered by examining additional historical examples that the 
above-made conjecture, together with its interpretation i terms of classifica- 
tory correspondence, is wrong; after all, its inductive basis is rather narrow. 
Even in that case my discussion still constitutes a counterargument to the 
realist contention that realism is the only possible xplanation of the predictive 
success of science. This implies in turn that the realist explanation given in 
section 1 cannot be transformed into a logically sound argument. If it is 
possible to account for the miracle intuition without resorting to a realist 
interpretation, this demonstrates at least that reference is not necessary for 
strong success. And this entails that the Miracle Argument is in no way the 
"Ultimate Argument" for realism. 
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